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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the potential to merge the achievement
of public policy objectives with private development of the
New Chardon site, a state-owned parcel located in downtown
Boston. In June 1986, Governor Dukakis dedicated the 3.1-
acre site to residential use and announced a major
affordable housing initiative.
The critical unresolved public policy choice associated with
development concerns the distribution of development
benefits. Among the large population affected by the
current housing crisis, who will be the beneficiaries of
this project? More specifically, who is the resident type
-- income level, household size and age -- to whom the
development will be marketed? This thesis offers a
framework for decision-making by exploring the interrelated
issues of public policy and financial feasibility through an
analysis of development options. The analysis is designed
to direct the Commonwealth in setting housing policy
priorities for the New Chardon development.
First, the opportunities and constraints associated with the
site are identified. Second, the recent decision to
dedicate the parcel to residential use is placed in
perspective by examining the value of the Commonwealth's
contribution and the severity of the current housing crisis.
Next, development options corresponding to three different
public policy approaches to income mix are explored for
their ability to satisfy both public policy goals and
financial feasibility criteria: 1) 100% affordable; 2)50%
market-rate / 50% affordable; and 3)25% affordable with land
value extracted and linked to development of another
affordable housing site. Fourth, New Chardon's significance
for state-sponsored housing programs is established. The
thesis concludes by examining the disposition process,
highlighting the Commonwealth's opportunity to shape the
ultimate development through its drafting of RFP guidelines
and the City's ability to impact the final product.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Planning and
Real Estate Development
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Exhibits ......................................
Overview ..............................................
Chapter 1: Opportunities & Constraints ....
- Government Center Urban Renewal Plan
- Land Disposition Agreement .
- State Service Center .......
- Current Context ............
Chapter 2: The Housing Decision ..
- Commonwealth's Contribution
- Housing Crisis .............
Chapter 3: Development Options ...
- Housing Economics ..........
- Development Scenarios ......
- Non-Housing Economics ......
Chapter 4: New Chardon As A Model .....................
Chapter 5: Disposition Process ...
- Chapter 579 ................
- Community Advisory Committee
- RFP Guidelines
- City's Role .................
Endnotes ..............................................
Appendix ..............................................
Acknowledgements ......................................
3
4
5
10
10
13
16
19
24
25
28
34
36
43
54
59
64
64
67
68
72
75
76
93
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.........
.. . . .0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
..
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
............. a 0
LIST OF EXHIBITS
1: Area of Property Map ...........................-- 77
2: Site Locus Map .........................-. ----- ... 78
3: Government Center Property Map .................... 79
4: Government Center Proposed Land Use Map ........... 80
5: State Service Center Plan .......................... 81
6: Site District Map ................................... 82
7: Total Development Cost ........................... 83
8: Comparable Sales: Market-rate Condominiums,
Downtown Boston ................................. .. 84
9: Affordability Standards ........................... 85
10: Sales Proceeds vs. Development Cost
By Unit Type ... ................................. 86
11: Sensitivity Analysis ............................. 87
12: Garage Operating Pro Forma ....................... 88
13: Non-Housing Operating Pro Forma .................... 89
14: Non-Housing Operating Pro Forma,
Additional Equity Contribution .................... 90
15: Non-Housing Operating Pro Forma, UDAG ............. 91
16: Community Advisory Committee Membership
Roster . .......................................... 92
4
OVERVIEW
On June 4, 1986, Governor Michael Dukakis announced a
major housing initiative for a state-owned, undeveloped
parcel in downtown Boston. The 3.1-acre site, located at
the corner of New Chardon and Merrimac Streets, is part of
an 8.4-acre parcel originally included in the 1960's urban
renewal plan for Government Center (Exhibit 1,2). A State
Service Center, master planned by Paul Rudolph, was the
intended use. The Hurley Employment Security Building and
Lindemann Mental Health Center were built, but a third
component, a state office tower was never constructed. The
New Chardon site has remained highly underdeveloped, while
its value has increased enormously. Today, it is a prime
urban parcel and important to revitalization of the adjacent
Bulfinch Triangle area. Dedication of one of its most
valuable downtown parcels to residential use dramatically
demonstrates the magnitude of the Commonwealth's commitment
to alleviating the current housing crisis and, in
particular, to delivering affordable housing in downtown
Boston.
The delivery of affordable housing on the New Chardon
site is today a vision loosely defined by the Governor's
press conference remarks: four hundred units of mixed-income
housing favoring homeownership opportunities for middle
income, first-time homebuyers. A retail component, day care
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center and parking garage were included in the proposal.
Since the announcement, provision of a shelter facility as
an extension of the Lindemann Center has emerged as a
priority. To promote feasibility, the State offered a land
cost writedown or favorable lease structure and below-market
rate financing to be funded by its Homeownership Opportunity
Program (HOP) established in early 1985. Sufficiently broad,
the charter can be translated into reality through several
development alternatives.
The New Chardon initiative is bold in concept, and in
broadest terms its challenge is to merge the achievement of
public policy objectives with private sector development.
The project is complex in its programmatic demands and
intriguing in its possibilities for integrating housing with
the rest of the site. Critical to success of the venture is
making sound development decisions. To explore development
potential and build consensus, the Division of Capital
Planning and Operations (DCPO), in conjunction with the
Executive Office of Communities and Development, has
convened a Community Advisory Committee (CAC). The CAC, an
impressive roster of local representation and industry
expertise, will work through the summer to resolve issues of
housing policy, financial feasibility and urban design. The
output of the process is to be a set of guidelines for
development of the site to be included in the Request For
Proposals (RFP) to the private development community. DCPO
has set an aggressive schedule. Legislation in support of
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the New Chardon development is projected to be filed as
early as October, 1986. A developer selection process will
follow with developer designation expected by early 1987,
thereby completing the disposition process.
This thesis approaches the issue of delivering affordable
housing on the New Chardon site as the challenge unfolds as
of this writing. The critical unresolved public policy
choice associated with development concerns the distribution
of development benefits. For whom will the project be
constructed? More specifically, who is the resident type --
income level, household size and age -- to whom the
development will be marketed? Together, policy objectives
and market forces will be the determinants of resident mix.
This thesis offers a framework for decision-making by
exploring the interrelated issues of public policy and
financial feasibility through an analysis of development
options. The conclusions will serve to direct the
Commonwealth and CAC in setting housing policy priorities
for the New Chardon development and ultimately form the
basis for legislation.
The analysis is designed to establish parameters within
which the potential of the New Chardon development can be
assessed. The economics of building and selling affordable
units on the downtown site are analyzed to expose the cost
and benefit of including various resident groups and unit
types in the development. Based upon these housing
7
economics, development options corresponding to three
different policy approaches to income mix are explored.
These scenarios are presented to broadly test the limits of
financial feasibility: 1) 100% affordable; 2) 50% market-
rate / 50% affordable; and 3) 25% affordable with land value
extracted and linked to development of another affordable
housing site. Each is evaluated for its ability to satisfy
public policy objectives and generate returns attractive to
a private developer. Additionally, the economics of the
non-housing portion of the development are examined and
reviewed for the potential to enhance affordability through
cross-subsidy of the housing component.
In total, this thesis relates the challenges associated
with disposition and development of the site, provides a
basis for decisions regarding the distribution of
development benefits and points to the form that the
development may eventually take. Chapter One introduces the
New Chardon site, revealing its opportunities and
constraints by recounting its history and identifying its
current context. The recent decision to dedicate the parcel
to residential use is placed in perspective in Chapter Two
by examining the value of the State's contribution and
severity of the current housing crisis in Boston. Alternate
development options and their ability to satisfy both public
policy objectives and financial feasibility criteria are
analyzed in Chapter Three. Chapter Four, synthesizing the
8
policy directives and economic potential established in
earlier chapters, presents New Chardon's expected
significance for state-sponsored housing programs. The
thesis concludes by examining the disposition process,
highlighting the Commonwealth's opportunity to shape the
ultimate development through the drafting of RFP guidelines
and the City's ability to influence the final product.
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CHAPTER 1
OPPORTUNITIES & CONSTRAINTS
The New Chardon parcel is one of the largest developable
sites in downtown Boston and remains, as it has for the past
fifteen years, a piece of unfinished business. Among
fifteen parcels covered under the Government Center Urban
Renewal Plan, it is one of only two uncompleted projects and
is testimony to incomplete planning. Originally part of the
State Service Center, the parcel is a leftover. Its
development must respond to the uses and structures existing
on the site and is subject to the original Urban Renewal
Plan. While the site has remained inactive over the past
fifteen years, the area around it has not. Today, the
parcel is situated at the dynamic juncture of several
districts and on-going or proposed development activity.
Together, its rich history and current context establish the
opportunities and constraints associated with the site and
form a framework for development options. In particular,
the land disposition agreement with the City and the
architectural legacy left by Paul Rudolph have important
implications for today's disposition process and urban
design solution.
Government Center Urban Renewal Plan
The site is part of Government Center, a sixty-acre tract
acquired by the City of Boston under provisions of Federal
10
urban renewal legislation (Exhibit 3). Comprised of
approximately thirty federal, state and city office
buildings, Government Center is one of the most ambitious
and successful redevelopment projects in the country.
Government Center occupies what was formerly the plains
of Trimount. Settled in 1630 by John Winthrop and the
Massachusetts Bay Company, the peninsula was appealing for
its fresh water supply, safe vantage from Indian attack and
easy access to river and harbor trade routes. Trimount was
renamed Boston, and by the end of the 18th century, its
topography had been altered to its present form by means of
damming and cut-and-fill operations.
Boston's earliest hub was the Townhouse, standing today
as the Old State House. Retail evolved in the Washington and
Summer Streets vicinity, while the financial district
developed around Broad, State, Franklin and Milk Streets.
The shipping industry gradually moved north and south of
Quincy Market due to the availability of filled land and
longer wharves. The land between Haymarket, Dock, Scollay
and Bowdoin Squares -- most of the current Government Center
-- emerged as a service area, housing the city's finest
hotels and restaurants. However, as Exhibit 3 illustrates,
the westernmost portion of the tract which is the New
Chardon parcel consisted of lots considerably smaller in
size suggesting residential use. In fact, this area was
part of the West End neighborhood.
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Scollay Square, adjacent to the central business
district, remained the prime social, business and political
center until the early 1870's. Its demise is largely
attributable to two factors. First, The Great Boston Fire
of 1872 destroyed over sixty-five acres of highly developed
land including the business district. Largely due to the
excessive time required to rebuild the district, the
business center slowly edged southward. This movement away
from Scollay Square coupled with the rise of elegant hotels
in the Back Bay, such as the Hotel Vendome, drained vitality
from Government Center. The second factor was the presence
of the naval shipyard in Charlestown. A series of wars, up
to and including World War II, brought droves of sailors to
Boston, and in time, Government Center lost its reputation
for luxurious hotels, theatres, and restaurants and became a
center for naval on-shore entertainment: tattoo parlors,
burlesque theatres and hot dog stands.
Over the years, buildings became obsolete and hazardous
and property values declined. Though facilities were
substandard, the area was ideal for redevelopment due to its
proximity to government/business/retail activity and access
to existing public transit. Furthermore, its primarily non-
residential character was advantageous. Scollay Square was
chosen as the site for a proposed Civic Center as early as
1930, but little action was taken until the United States
Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, enabling cities to
12
effectuate slum clearance.
The area was classified as an Urban Renewal Area under
Title I of the Housing Act. "Government Center Study - A
Preliminary Report" was published by a mayoral committee in
1956 and gained widespread support. It proposed a complex
of new federal, state and city office buildings along with
several private structures in the Pemberton-Dock Square
area.
In 1960, the Massachusetts Legislature abolished the City
of Boston Planning Board and transferred its powers and
duties to the recently formed Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA). Concurrently, the Mayor proposed that the Government
Center project be executed as a non-residential, federally-
funded redevelopment. With a new city administration, a
newly organized redevelopment authority and necessary public
sector support, Government Center began to take form. I.M.
Pei & Partners was hired to master plan Government Center
and to coordinate other architects commissioned to design
individual structures. In October of 1961, demolition was
initiated.
Land Disposition Agreement
According to the land use plan proposed by I.M. Pei &
Partners, the Government Center project area was carved into
fourteen separate parcels. The State development parcel,
framed by the newly routed New Chardon and Cambridge,
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Staniford and Merrimac Streets, was designated Disposition
Parcel 1 (Exhibit 4).
The Commonwealth and BRA entered into a land disposition
agreement dated February 2, 1965. In the Agreement, the BRA
agreed to convey the parcel to the Commonwealth for a price
of $1.75 million (MM). The conveyance was subject to several
restrictions and provisions. The property had to be used
for public office and institution. Further, the state
agreed not to use the property or any part thereof for any
use other than public office and institution. Consequently,
although a substantial part of the parcel is already devoted
to the uses set forth in the Agreement, the remaining vacant
parcel cannot be used for any other purpose. The state
cannot transfer its interest in the property to another
entity prior to completion of the building project unless
the transferee assumes all obligations of the Commonwealth.
The BRA does not enjoy a right of reverter in the property
in the event the building project is not completed. These
restrictions were placed as covenants in the deed and
terminate on the expiration date of the Urban Renewal Plan
in 2003.1
Subsequent to the execution of the Agreement, the BRA
conveyed to the Commonwealth Parcel 1A by a deed dated
February 10, 1965. Parcel 1B consists of a triangular piece
of land at the corner of Merrimac and New Chardon on which
the Langone Funeral Home is located. It has never been
14
conveyed to the Commonwealth.
Both the Agreement and Deed are subject to the Government
Center Urban Renewal Plan which restricts permitted uses to
public office and institution. To date, neither the
Agreement nor Urban Renewal Plan have been amended. So, the
proposed housing plan is incongruent with existing
documents, and the Commonwealth will require several
approvals from the BRA Board of Directors to proceed with
the development as planned. As such, the BRA has a formal
basis for review of the project extending beyond its usual
authority to regulate development in Boston. This
heightened role of the City will be further discussed in
context of the disposition process and political
feasibility.
The Land Disposition Agreement needs to be amended to
reflect new priorities by deleting the clause prohibiting
use of the parcel or any portion thereof for any uses other
than public office and institution. Additionally, the Deed
must be amended releasing the State from use restrictions.
Both amendments can be accomplished with the consent of both
parties to the agreements. However, modification of the
Urban Renewal Plan requires further approval by the Boston
City Council and Executive Office of Communities &
Development. Unlike the Agreement, the Plan designates
public office and institution as the use but does not
specify that a portion of the parcel cannot be used for
15
other purposes once public office space has been
constructed. DCPO and BRA counsel will have to determine if
the Plan requires amendment, but clearly the process is
simpler if it is deemed unnecessary. In principle, housing
as a use has been accepted by all parties. Amendment of the
documents, though, remains a legality capable of tying-up
the disposition process.
State Service Center
The Commonwealth was authorized to purchase Parcel 1 (lA
& 1B) by Chapter 635 of the Acts of 1960 which established
the Government Center Commission as the acquiring entity.
The Commission was further authorized to build thereon a
health, welfare and education service center consisting of
(1) a mental health center and state laboratories building;
(2) an employment security building and (3) a health,
welfare and education building.
The complex was conceived by coordinating architect, Paul
Rudolph, as three separate buildings consolidated into a
single shell curling around the site, forming a grand plaza
in front of a heavily sculpted tower (Exhibit 5). Of the
three sections proposed, only two were built: The Hurley
Employment Security Building, designed by Shepley Bulfinch
Richardson and Abbott and named for Charles F. Hurley,
governor from 1937-39; and the Eric Lindemann Mental Health
Center, designed by Desmond & Lord and Paul Rudolph. Both
buildings opened in 1971. The six-story, 365,500 square
16
foot Hurley Building houses the Unemployment Insurance
Claims office, job placement centers and administrative
offices. The seven-level, 257,200 square foot Lindemann
Center functions primarily as a community out-patient
treatment facility. Specially constructed for the Department
of Mental Health, it contains special purpose patient and
laboratory space.
The proposed twenty-four story tower, intended as
executive offices for several state departments and to be
called the Health, Welfare and Education Building was never
constructed. Design review problems ensued and Rudolph was
taken off the project by the Government Center Commission.
Eventually, a thirty-three story tower designed by both
Shepley Bulfinch and Desmond & Lord was approved, but cost
overruns and a change of administrations halted
construction. Authorized to spend $43.5MM on the entire
complex, the Commission had only $11.5MM left with the two
completed buildings, garage and landscaping funded. The
tower, estimated at $33MM, would have required an additional
$22MM appropriation. The costs were clearly excessive. On
a per square foot basis, Hurley cost $52.40, while Lindemann
cost $84.76.2 In current dollars, the expenditures,
respectively, are approximately $140 and $230 per square
foot! To an extent, monumentalism is appropriate in public
architecture but perhaps as Ada Louise Huxtable wrote in
reference to the structure, "its drama may have been
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overwrought for its purpose."3
The building is a massive showpiece of architectural
expression in exposed concrete design. Several concrete
textures have been utilized, though most of the concrete
finish is gear-toothed -- a pattern of vertical flutes whose
forwardmost edges were manually chipped away after wooden
forms were removed and concrete set. The exposed aggregates
catch light, add texture and create depth. A sinuous
flowing form, the structure's curvilinear volumes, both
recessed and projecting, are suggestive of the swell and ebb
of the ocean. Curved planes are used extensively throughout
the interior, reinforcing the motif. The structure's shape
is said to resemble that of the State of Massachusetts.
Rudolph's design for the plaza has been compared with
both the Piazza del Campo and the Piazza San Marco in
Venice. The plaza was planned as a striated, three-level
space extending from a series of great curved stairs. Walls
were to be stepped back from the central plaza to create a
terraced effect. According to Rudolph, the structures were
designed to form a specific interior space for pedestrians
only. As such, the keynote is the unfinished plaza, not the
missing, focal tower.
In 1975, Governor Dukakis allowed the Government Center
Commission to lapse out of existence. In 1980, the Boston
Landmarks Commission rated the complex a Category II
Building, denoting major significance for its "sculptural
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exo-structure in the Expressionistic style." The vacant
land is now under the control of the Division of Capital
Planning & Operations as a result of Chapter 685 of 1982
which placed full responsibility for state buildings in the
Government Center area with the Bureau of State Office
Buildings. Meanwhile, the truncated State Service Center
remains a modern ruin awaiting completion.
Completion of the site would fill a void in the building
fabric and demands a sensitive, creative urban design
approach. Housing must be responsibly integrated into an
otherwise institutional block. Materials and scale must be
compatible with those of existing structures, yet more
hospitable than the concrete corduroy. Through completion
of the plaza, the development is charged with endowing the
site with the architectural integrity originally intended.
Current Context
The entire site, bounded by New Chardon, Merrimac,
Staniford and Cambridge Streets, is approximately 360,000
square feet (SF). The Hurley and Lindemann buildings occupy
225,000 square feet of the site, leaving approximately
135,000 square feet of land available for development.
Zoning is currently B-8, "general business," with a maximum
allowable FAR of 8. Highly underdeveloped, the site is
built to an FAR of 1.7. Allowable height is 420 feet.
Terrain is sloped with a grade change of thirty-eight feet
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along New Chardon from Cambridge down to Merrimac.
State vehicles currently utilize the vacant lot during
working hours. In 1984, DCPO let a parking lot operator's
license for nightly use. The three-year license can be
terminated at thirty days notice by DCPO.
The New Chardon parcel is located at the nexus of several
districts and is within the vicinity of on-going or planned
development activity (Exhibit 6).
Government Center
The rest of the Government Center complex surrounds the
parcel to the south and west. Uses nearest the site,
across New Chardon Street, are mid-rise private office
buildings and the Government Center Garage. The garage is
to be reconstructed to include office space on two
additional upper floors and retail on the ground floor.
The 24-story John F. Kennedy Federal Building is located
behind the private office buildings.
Bulfinch Triangle
Across Merrimac Street, this enclave of 19th century, six
to eight-story brick buildings planned by Charles Bulfinch
is being steadily upgraded for commercial use. Over $40MM
of development investment has been infused into the area
over the past three years, pushing out its mini-combat
zone. Rents are currently at the $18-22/SF level up from
$8-10/SF in 1982.4
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North Station
The North Station area extends from the Boston Garden and
the new General Services Administration (GSA) building
westward to the Charles River and has been designated a
Commercial Area Revitalization District deserving of zoning
incentives and tax-exempt financing. The BRA is currently
wrestling with two developer proposals, each for an
office/hotel/retail/garage mixed-use complex behind a new
or renovated arena. Occupancy of the GSA building is
expected in August, 1986.
Two major infrastructure projects were requisite to
location of the GSA building in North Station: relocation
of the MBTA elevated Green Line below ground and widening
of Merrimac Street. Depression of the Green line is
expected by early 1991. The proposed street widening
consumes nearly three-quarters of the Langone Funeral Home
now located on the development parcel. It is assumed,
therefore, that the BRA will have to relocate Langone
anyway, such that, the matter becomes a non-issue for the
New Chardon project.
Lowell Square
Both the City and Jerome Rappaport, developer of adjacent
Charles River Park, claim ownership of this site. Despite
on-going litigation, the 1.5-acre parcel is available for
development. An RFP with guidelines for a mixed-income
residential development was released by the BRA in May,
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1986. Fifty percent of the units are to be available at
market rates, twenty-five percent affordable to moderate-
income residents and twenty-five percent affordable to low-
income residents. The project may include an office/retail
component and is subject to a 230-foot height limitation.
West End
The West End, an ethnically integrated though dilapidated
neighborhood of some 3,000 families, was razed in the early
1960's as part of the 48-acre West End Land Assembly and
Redevelopment Project. In its place towers Charles River
Park, a high-end residential complex. The last phase of the
project, 38-story Longfellow Place, is adjacent to the
State Service Center.
As previously noted, the New Chardon parcel prior to urban
renewal was part of the West End, more like it in character
and activity than it was Scollay Square. Boston is saddened
by the broad-brush approach to "urban removal" that
eradicated the old street pattern, disrupted the
traditional mix of residential and commmercial use, and
dispersed a neighborhood of families. Having come full
circle, the State is now planning a residential development
on the site with references to a new Old West End.
In general, residential development of the site is
congruent with the City's growth policies for central Boston
as outlined in "Downtown Guidelines" drafted in July of 1985
22
and with BRA planning for the immediate area. Among BRA
staff, several key design elements are considered important
to reinforcing other develpments in the area. Capitalizing
upon the original design, the development has the potential
to offer a pedestrian link between Government Center and
North Station through the large block via an existing grand
staircase penetrating Lindemann at mid-level. Completion of
the internal plaza is paramount and can create a desirable
open space for the City. Lastly, retail uses and
redevelopment of areas around the base, particularly
animation of the mini-plaza at the corner of Merrimac and
New Chardon, would enable the complex to more successfully
address the street.5
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CHAPTER 2
THE HOUSING DECISION
Development of the New Chardon parcel had been discussed
by state authorities on and off during the past fifteen
years; however, most of the proposals focused on state
facility needs and office opportunities. The housing
decision, largely an executive choice initiated by Secretary
Frank Keefe of the Office of Administration & Finance,
represents a fresh approach to the site.
The Governor's housing decision was an expedient one.
Given the increasingly high level of development in downtown
Boston, the State was facing mounting pressure to act. Over
the course of the next several months, two key state
positions involved with real property disposition were to be
vacated by officials with strong track records: Deputy
Commissioner Tunney Lee, DCPO; and Director Linda Whitlock,
Real Property. This changing of the guard along with the
upcoming gubernatorial election encouraged a swift response.
State agencies were not clamoring for new central business
district space and, indeed, no budget had been allocated.
Meanwhile, Boston was and continues to be in the midst of a
severe housing crisis, and the expansion of housing supply,
particularly affordable units, had become a top public
priority. Acting progressively, Governor Dukakis, flanked
by Mayor Flynn and Senate President Bulger, announced the
New Chardon housing initiative on June 4, 1986.
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For purposes of this thesis, the decision to develop
housing units versus office space is considered a given.
Yet, probing two issues surrounding the decision helps place
it in perspective and expose its tradeoffs. What is the
State giving up? And what is the nature of the housing
crisis that sparked the choice? In other words, in
alleviating the crisis, what is the State getting in return?
Commonwealth's Contribution
Implicit in its housing decision, the State has foregone
the opportunity to develop the New Chardon site for state
offices. Currently, the Commonwealth leases nearly 2.1MM
square feet of office space in Boston alone, at an annual
cost of approximately $22.5MM. While much of this space is
for neighborhood services offices, over 1.0MM square feet is
leased for central agency offices in downtown Boston with
agencies leasing over 40,000 square feet accounting for
eighty percent of the space. Leased space represents
approximately thirty percent of total state space, leased
and owned. This downtown space is generally leased in older
Class B or Class C buildings in less than prime locations
where the State serves as an economic anchor. As recently
as 1981, state agencies leased such space for $6-9/SF 6, but
lease costs have risen significantly over the past several
years to over $17/SF today. Strong market conditions have
prompted the renovation of many Class C buildings, expanding
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and increasing the cost of Class B space and reducing Class
C supply. Construction of a state office building on the
New Chardon site could have been an alternative to short-
term leasing, efficiently consolidating space and
controlling cost.
More recent state facility planning efforts considered
the site's increased value as a private development parcel.
A plan was outlined by DCPO which utilized the high private
development potential of the site to provide state office
space without capital appropriation. The plan involved
making the site available for private development while
requiring the developer to include a specified amount of
space to be leased to the State on a long-term basis at a
greatly discounted cost. The proposal was quite viable,
assuming a deal could be negotiated with the City to amend
the Land Disposition Agreement. Preliminary estimates
indicated that a one million square foot private office
building could support 200,000-300,000 square feet of state
office space at a cost of $2-5/SF exclusive of operating
costs.7
Increasingly though, the most pressing needs of state
agencies are for back-office space, more effectively
delivered through construction of a horizontal operations
center on a state-owned parcel outside of Boston. If,
however, centralization of state office space becomes a
future priority, the cost to taxpayers of assembling a site
26
comparable to New Chardon will be exorbitant.
In 1965, the Commonwealth acquired the entire 8.4-acre
parcel for $1.75MM, so that proportionately, the current
developable parcel cost approximately $656,000. According
to the BRA, new downtown office developments currently pay
$40-50 per FAR Gross Square Foot.8 Discounting the price to
$35/FAR GSF given New Chardon's slightly non-CBD location
and applying the allowable FAR of 8 yields a current land
value of $37.8MM. Realistically, in light of city efforts
to downsize downtown development, the site is unlikely to be
built above an FAR of 4. Still, the value of the parcel in
office use approximates $20MM.
Given the housing decision, the most appropriate
valuation of the State's land contribution is its residual
value in a residential use. The residual value is
equivalent to the maximum price a private developer would
pay for the site if zoned residential and subject to only
the ten percent inclusionary zoning regulation now proposed
by the City. Under the assumptions of the model detailed in
Chapter Three including market rate sales of $250/NSF and a
desired 15% return on sales and assets, the parcel's value
approximates $16.5MM. For its contribution of a prime piece
of Boston real estate, the Commonwealth must ensure that
housing supply and affordability are significantly impacted
on the site.
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Housing Crisis
The City is facing a severe housing crisis characterized
by tight supply and rapidly escalating price. Advertised
rents in Boston increased eighteen to thirty-one percent
annually between 1982 and 1985 and yet, the vacancy rate for
rental housing is almost invisible. This pressue on the
rental stock is further fueled by the skyrocketing costs of
homeownership. According to the National Association of
Realtors, the Boston metro area experienced the greatest
inflation of home prices in the nation during both 1984 and
1985 at a staggering twenty-three and thirty-eight percent.
The average Boston area single-family home price reached
$144,800 in 1985. Need is projected to continue to outpace
supply. Economic expansion is expected to create housing
demand of 3,500-5,000 dwellings per year, in Boston over the
next decade. In contrast, only 13,000 units were
constructed, converted or rehabbed during the 1980-85
period.9
Expansion of the overall housing supply, and "affordable"
units in particular, is a major priority for city and state
government. The means to stimulate production is a subject
of debate among developers and public policy makers. In
1983, The City of Boston established a linkage program which
requires developers of commercial projects over 100,000
square feet seeking zoning relief to contribute a housing
exaction fee to a trust fund used to subsidize affordable
unit production. Alternatively, a developer could build or
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renovate housing off-site at a cost at least equal to the
fee. However, the program has been invalidated by the
Superior Court on grounds that such regulatory behavior is
beyond the scope of municipal power. Recently, the BRA
proposed an inclusionary zoning regulation which would
require a minimum of thirty-five percent affordable housing
on city-owned parcels and a minimum of ten percent on
privately-owned parcels.
Affordable housing is categorized by established federal
guidelines. Specifically, "low-income" housing is affordable
to households earning up to fifty percent of the Boston SMSA
median income. Similarly, "moderate-income" housing is
affordable to households earning up to eighty percent of
median. Affordable is defined as requiring no more than
thirty percent of household income for housing-related costs
In the current crisis, another group deserving of attention
has emerged. This group will be designated "middle-income"
and represents households earning eighty percent of the
Boston SMSA median income to ten percent above it. Due to
the high cost of housing, particularly downtown, units may
require an income as much as 115-130% of median in order to
be affordable. Middle income residents, shut out of the
homeownership market, drive up rental prices by competing
with low and moderate-income residents for scarce rental
stock. Overall, there exists a large population of
potential beneficiaries of state and city-sponsored housing
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programs.
The New Chardon initiative's approach to dealing with
this widespread housing phenomenon is yet to be fully
defined. Governor Dukakis' press conference remarks did,
however, indicate that proposed housing would accommodate
the needs of moderate and middle-income households
characterized as the "nurses at Massachusetts General
Hospital, the clerks in Boston's downtown stores and people
who work for the State and City" who have been shut out of
the downtown homeownership market. Homeownership versus
rental opportunities were stressed for two likely reasons.
Ownership is thought to offer more to a citizen than the
privilege of living in someone else's building and is
supported by the State's Homeownership Opportunity Program.
Secondly, the pending tax reform bill through its provisions
for a longer depreciable life and loss of tax benefits makes
financing a rental project very difficult. In addition,
necessary covenants to maintain long-term affordability
which would prohibit conversion for many years render rental
housing less attractive to a developer. Because of this
imposing financing environment and the political momentum
behind the Homeownership Opportunity Program, the preference
for ownership over rental is considered fixed for purposes
of this thesis.
Given the severity of the housing crisis and the high
development value of the New Chardon parcel, it may be
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argued, from an efficiency standpoint, that affordable
housing should not be built on the downtown site at all.
Instead, the land value might be extracted by putting the
site to another use, either private office or market-rate
housing. Proceeds from the land sale might then be infused
into a suburban affordable housing project in which
construction costs are lower, thereby providing more "bang
for the buck." The New Chardon initiative, though, is not
premised upon a theory of highest and best use. Rather, it
is underpinned by the idea that downtown residential
development -- for all income brackets -- is both highly
desirable and worthy of promotion.
City administrations have been generally quite favorable
to downtown residential growth. According to BRA Director,
Stephen Coyle, it is a means to "create the livable
downtown, the 24-hour city."10 Housing adds vitality to the
central city in off-peak hours, helps keep the streets safe
and reduces the load on the transportation system by
allowing more people to walk to their workplaces or
entertainment centers. The Boston Chamber of Commerce
strongly endorses downtown housing. The BRA considers
housing central to its downtown planning efforts and has
evaluated the site potential of infill lots, large vacant
parcels and the Fort Point Channel area for residential
development. Nonetheless, market forces and the
availability of financing programs have largely determined
the nature of constructed housing. High downtown site costs
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and competition with the expanding office market are
restricting most construction for residential use to high
amenity areas such as the Waterfront and Public Garden.
Luxury condominiums have been the favored housing type.
Rental construction has been limited. The two exceptions,
the Devonshire and Greenhouse, were both financed under
terms currently unavailable. Without favorable public
programs and incentives, the production of affordable
housing in downtown is severely constrained.
The Commonwealth has committed itself to the delivery of
affordable housing. In early 1985, the Massachusetts
Housing Partnership (MHP) was formed as a public/private
effort to address housing needs and expand opportunities for
affordable housing. Its first initiative, the Homeownership
Opportunity Program (HOP), enables moderate and middle-
income households previously shut out of the homebuying
market to purchase first homes. Below-market interest rate
mortgages from the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA), currently at 8.85%, are available to middle-income
households. MHP funds are used for an interest rate buy-
down, thereby providing a further reduced 5.85% borrowing
rate for households of moderate-income. Mortgage rates are
structured to increase a maximum of three points over nine
years. For a project to qualify for HOP funds, at least
twenty-five percent of the units must be affordable to
moderate-income households. Long-term affordability of these
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units is ensured by deed restrictions limiting appreciation
upon resale. Also, up to $5MM in Community Development
Action Grant (CDAG) funds is being provided to construct
infrastructure associated with housing developments. The
legislature is currently considering a proposal to
contribute an additional $100MM from the budget surplus to
the $220MM program.
Currently, MHP has twenty-eight projects in the pipeline
for HOP funding. To date, no disbursements have been made.
Applications have represented a geographic and development
entity mix. The size of developments has varied as well,
but the majority of current proposals are for projects under
one hundred units. HOP funds totaling $35MM have been
earmarked for the City of Boston as part of a $71.3MM
package of state housing assistance funds. So far, only one
Boston application has been received, for a project in the
West Fenway area.
Highly visible, in the heart of downtown Boston, New
Chardon can be a tangible, working example of the
application of the Commonwealth's recent housing initiatives
and a showpiece representative of HOP efforts. As a symbol
of these steps and proof that the State can deliver
affordable housing especially in downtown Boston, the New
Chardon development must look good and perform well.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS
As proposed by the Commonwealth, the New Chardon project
is structured as a public-private partnership. The State
contributes land and buyer-financing in exchange for
affordable housing for its residents, while the developer
applies expertise and assumes development risk for a
reasonable return. The product is to be an economically and
environmentally sound development that merges the
achievement of public goals with private development. Among
its policy objectives, the State foremost seeks to:
(1) significantly impact housing supply and
affordability, and in doing so, create a
shining symbol of state-sponsored housing
programs, particularly homeownership
initiatives;
(2) conclusively demonstrate that affordable
housing can be delivered in Boston, and in
particular downtown, where the obstacles to
effective delivery are greatest;
(3) equitably distribute development benefits
among the large population of potential
recipients affected by the housing crisis;
(4) creatively solve the urban design challenge
while respectfully responding to existing
uses and architecture on-site.
Of four key public policy choices associated with
development of the New Chardon site, three have already been
made - what, how and how much. Housing is the determined
use. Ownership is the preferred method of delivery. High
density is deemed appropriate and necessary, and an
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approximate number of units is identified. It is the
distribution of development benefits that remains
unresolved. The question is for whom will the development
be built? The inclusion of moderate and middle-income
first-time homebuyers is understood from the Governor's
press conference, but even if that is the policy thrust,
many issues remain unsettled. For example, are households
of low-income to be accommodated on the site too? To what
extent should or must market-rate units be included in the
development? Should individuals or families, or both, be
targeted for housing opportunities? Should there be
provisions for the inclusion of elderly units? Determining
a desirable resident mix that satisfies both policy
objectives and financial feasibility criteria will, in
conjunction with the decisions already made, broadly define
the nature of the New Chardon development.
Three parameters will define New Chardon's resident
profile: the mix of affordable units and market-rate units;
the income mix within the affordable category; and in
shaping the income mix, the household type in terms of size
and age, key factors typically defining an income-eligible
household. Together, policy objectives and market forces
will set the parameters. By evaluating the financial
feasibility of various public policy approaches to resident
mix, this chapter offers a framework for decision-making.
The analysis identifies the basic economics at work on the
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site and is designed to assist the Commonwealth and CAC in
setting housing policy priorities for the New Chardon
development.
Initially, the economics of building and selling
affordable units on this downtown site are analyzed to
expose the cost, benefit and tradeoff of including various
resident groups and unit types in the development. Based
upon these housing economics, development options
corresponding to three different policy approaches to income
mix are explored: 1) 100% affordable; 2) 50% market-rate /
50% affordable; and 3) 25% affordable with land value
extracted and linked to development of another affordable
housing site. Each is considered for its ability to satisfy
public policy objectives and meet financial feasibility
criteria. Lastly, the economics of the non-housing elements
-- garage, retail, day care and shelter -- are examined and
reviewed for the potential to subsidize the housing
component. In total, the analysis provides a basis for
decisions regarding the distribution of development benefits
and points to the form that the development may eventually
take.
Housin Economics
New Chardon's potential for affordable production is
derived from and limited by a basic set of economics at work
on the site. Costs and revenues behave in certain ways, and
it is these relationships that fundamentally underlie the
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financial consequences of any resident mix scenario.
Delivery of affordable housing on downtown sites such as
New Chardon is squeezed by the high cost of development.
The constraints of operating on a site within a densely
developed area, the use of union labor, building code
regulations, and in most cases, high site acquisition fees
combine to create the cost premium. Clearly, at this early
stage of pre-development, a design scheme for New Chardon is
fluid and construction cost is difficult to ascertain. The
project is expected though to contain a high-rise, mid-rise
and possibly townhouse component. A hard cost figure of
$75/gross square foot (GSF) is assumed and represents an
average of estimates provided by developers and contractors.
Total development cost for a 400-unit project built today is
estimated at $43.5MM, or equivalently $114.00/GSF, assuming
zero costs for site acquisition. Exhibit 7 presents the
economic assumptions upon which the calculation of
development cost is based for the three scenarios.
Potential revenues are generated from three sources:
market-rate units, affordable units and Boston Housing
Authority (BHA) units. Market-rate sales are conservatively
estimated at $250/net square foot (NSF) if sold today based
upon comparables in the downtown Boston area (Exhibit 8).
The pricing of affordable units is based upon an ability-to-
pay formula illustrated in Exhibit 9. The underlying
premise is that residents are expected to pay no more than
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30% of annual gross income on housing-related costs
including mortgage, taxes, insurance and condominium fees.
A down payment of only 5% is required in order to broaden
the reach of ownership opportunities. Accordingly, a
middle-income household borrowing at an 8.5% HOP rate can
carry a unit priced at 2.33 times household income. A
moderate-income household with a lower 5.5% borrowing rate
can support a unit worth 2.83 times income. If the average
income of middle-income (80%-110% median) purchasers is 100%
of median, then the average eligible income for a 1-bedroom,
middle-income unit is $25,500 and the average price of a 1-
bedroom, middle-income unit is $59,349. Lastly, the
developer may sell a number of units to the BHA, the City's
owner/operator of public housing, which would maintain the
units and rent them at affordable rates to households of
low-income. The BHA would be fully funded through the
Commonwealth's Chapter 705 Housing for Families and Chapter
667 Housing for Elderly programs. Under these programs,
sales prices are set by the Executive Office of Communities
& Development (EOCD) at levels expected to cover development
cost. Currently, the limits are $75,000 for a 1-bedroom
elderly unit and $90,000 and $110,000 for 2 and 3-bedroom
family units.
Table 1 below summarizes New Chardon's housing economics
by identifying the ratio of sales proceeds to development
cost by unit type for each income segment. The ratios are
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supported by an analysis in absolute dollars included as
Exhibit 10 in the Appendix. As indicated by ratios of less
than one, all affordable units are sold at a loss. Market-
rate sales proceeds exceed development cost by 75%,
equivalently providing a 43% gross margin, and are clearly
required to internally subsidize the affordable component.
TABLE 1
SALES PROCEEDS:DEVELOPMENT COST
BHA MODERATE MIDDLE MARKET
0-BEDROOM - .71 .78 1.75
1-BEDROOM .81 .59 .64 1.75
2-BEDROOM .66 .48 .53 1.75
3-BEDROOM .62 .42 .46 1.75
Average .77 .51 .56 1.75
It is important to recognize that while development cost
is variable within certain limits, affordable sales proceeds
are fixed. The average gap per unit between development cost
and sales price for a moderate and middle-income unit is,
respectively, $58,200 and $52,387. Equivalently, in terms
of the ratio of sales proceeds to cost, revenue from the
sale of moderate and middle-income units cover on average
only half of development cost. The gap is attributable to
high development cost per square foot as well as large unit
size. The assumed unit sizes are larger than those of many
affordable projects financed by MHFA yet smaller than those
of competitive market-rate developments downtown. For
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purposes of this analysis, sizes are uniform whether the
unit is market-rate or affordable. To the extent that unit
sizes are reduced, the gap between cost and proceeds will be
diminished since affordable sales prices are fixed.
However, market-rate sales per square foot, upon which
returns are highly dependent, will be compromised.
Additionally, the size of the gap increases as the unit
type expands from a 0-bedroom (studio) to a 3-bedroom. For
example, the ratio of sales proceeds to development cost for
middle-income units falls from .78 for a studio to .46 for a
3-bedroom. In reality, the cost per square foot of a studio
is greater than that of 3-bedroom unit since the studio
entails more intensive kitchen and bathroom construction per
square foot. As such, a studio may actually cost ten
percent more and a 3-bedroom ten percent less than the
average cost/NSF for all units in the development.
Nonetheless, the gap still increases as the unit type
expands because the cost of an additional room averages
$35,000 whereas the median income per household only
increases an average of approximately $3,000 for each
additional person. Therefore, all else being equal, the
number of affordable units supportable by the project will
increase as the unit type distribution approaches all
studios. Of course, the implications are marketing to a
limited segment of the market and creating a very homogenous
residential complex.
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Lastly, an incentive exists for inclusion of low-income
family (Chapter 705) and elderly (Chapter 667) units.
Although the BHA purchase prices fail to cover development
cost, creating an average shortfall of $43,708, they do
exceed the levels on the other affordable units. BHA units
provide an average sales to cost ratio of .77 compared to
.51 and .56 for moderate and middle-income units. To the
extent that BHA units replace other affordable units,
financial returns will be improved by cutting losses. For
instance, the sale of a 1-bedroom, moderate-income unit
generates a loss of $38,429 compared to sale of a 1-bedroom
BHA unit which creates a loss of $17,625. However, at some
point, the aura of public housing jeopardizes achievable
market rate sales. By statute, a maximum of twenty-four
705-units can be clustered in any one development. The
program promotes small-scale, scattered public housing
rather than the mega "projects" of earlier decades. On the
other hand, a minimum of forty elderly units must be
included in any one development under the 667 program
presumably to promote a sense of community.
Decisions regarding the distribution of unit types within
New Chardon will not be made on the basis of economics
alone. Though a financial incentive exists for the
inclusion of 705-family units, the first-order question is
whether or not the development is suitable for families.
Even if required play areas were to be built into the
project, it will remain a dense, primarily vertical
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development. Yards will be non-existent and of the
surrounding streets, Cambridge and New Chardon are two of
the busiest in the City during rush-hour. Furthermore, the
public school system is problematic. Even among families
for whom the high cost of downtown living and private
schools are within reach, there is little demand for a
downtown lifestyle. During the 1970's, the number of
children ages 0-19 living downtown declined 21%, while the
24-34 age cohort expanded by 82% and the trend is likely to
continue. It will be difficult for the Commonwealth to offer
a quality living environment for families on the New Chardon
site. Therefore, a likely development scenario will
include studios and 1-bedroom units along with 2-bedroom
units suitable for small families with an infant or perhaps
older teenage child. To the extent that the Chapter 705
progam is utilized, it will fund 2-bedroom units despite its
overriding preference for larger family units. A few
market-rate 3-bedroom units should be included to capture
the tremendous value of views available from the top few
floors of a high-rise built on the New Chardon site. Based
upon downtown sales patterns, these units will not likely be
occupied by families.
On the other hand, New Chardon is well suited for elderly
residents. Elevator, mid-rise or high-rise structures would
accommodate mobility needs and high density would not be a
negative factor since little utility is derived from large
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amounts of open recreational space. The site also offers a
central location easily accessible to shopping, banking and
government services. Lastly, accommodating self-sufficient
elderly residents would not impact design significantly; in
general, elderly developments include a common function room
and reduced parking demand. However, the inclusion of
elderly units conflicts with the goal to provide
homeownership opportunities for typically younger first-time
homebuyers. Furthermore, the need for elderly housing has
been met to a far greater extent than have the needs of
others caught in the housing crisis. Subsidized elderly
developments enjoy the reputation of being non-disruptive
and have been quite popular with communities. The decision
to include subsidized elderly units within New Chardon
hinges on the perceived merits of creating a cross-
generational project versus the need to accommodate first-
time homebuyers. The choice will be tempered by the
financial reality that the inclusion of Chapter 667 elderly
units enhances financial feasibility by closing the gap
between development cost and sales proceeds on 1-bedroom
affordable units without negatively impacting market-rate
sales potential.
Development Scenarios
The income mix scenarios presented below in Table 2 vary
by the extent to which they accommodate certain income
segments, but otherwise offer a similar housing package. The
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housing package in terms of sales prices, eligible-income
ranges and monthly cost to the owner/occupant is summarized
as Table 3 on the following page.
TABLE 2
INCOME MIX SCENARIOS
M IX 1 M I X 2 M I X3
BHA * 15% 15% -
MODERATE-INCOME 35% 25% 25%
MIDDLE-INCOME 50% 10%
MARKET - RATE - 50% 75%
* 10% Elderly, 5% Family
A total of 400 units are distributed within each income
group as follows: 15% studios, 40% one-bedrooms and 45% two-
bedrooms. If BHA units are proposed, they include twenty
family units and forty elderly units, representing 15% of
the development. Prices range from $50,580 to $71,220 for
affordable units and $125,000 to $237,500 for market-rate
units. Affordable ownership units serve a market segment
with average incomes ranging from $17,850 for one person to
$30,600 for a household of four, whereas BHA rental units
reach low-income households with income ranging from $12,750
to $15,300. Stated in other terms of affordability, the
average monthly housing payment for a moderate-income
household, for example, totals $445, $480, or $575 for a 0,
1 or 2-bedroom unit, respectively. Since the affordability
standards developed in this analysis (Exhibit 10) include
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TABLE 3
HOUSING PACKAGE
0-BEDROOM
1-BEDROOM
2-BEDROOM
(U7
0-BEDROOM
1-BEDROOM
2-BEDROOM
A V E
S A L E S
BHA Moderate
- 50,580
75,000 54,200
90,000 65,040
E L I G I
BHA Moderate
- 17,850
12,750 19,125
15,300 22,950
M 0
BHA-
320
380
R A G E
P R I C E ($)
MiddLe Market
55,390
59,350
71,220
125,000
162,500
237,500
I N C 0 M E (S)
MiddLe Market
23,800
25,500
30,600
A V E R A G E
N T H L Y C 0 S
Moderate Middle
445
480
575
595
640
765
36,315
47,210
69,000
T ($)
Market
1,270
1,650
2,410
NOTES: MothLy cost.includes mortgage, insurance, reaL estate taxes
ad cohdominium fees
Market-rate figures based upon a 20% down payTnt and.mortgage
at 9. % with debt service not exceeding 28% o gross income
Distribution
15%
40%
45%
0-BEDROOM
1-BEDROOM
2-BEDR00M
condominium fees -- given that they are out-of-pocket
expenses borne by owners -- whereas those used by EOCD do
not, financials are predicated upon lower affordable sales
prices. Therefore, to the extent that scenarios are
feasible, the proposed development supports deeper
affordability for its residents than current EOCD standards.
Since the development is in such a preliminary state and
the analysis is designed to test only basic feasibility,
several simplifying assumptions have been made. Across
scenarios, total development cost is estimated at $43.5MM,
while achievable market-rate sales are projected at
$250/NSF. Granted the physical product and marketing
strategy will vary whether the project is 100% affordable or
75% market-rate. However, sensitivity analysis can be
employed to test the impact of, for instance, higher
development cost due to higher grade finishes and/or higher
achievable market-rate sales. Furthermore, estimates are as
if the project were built and sold today. Once again,
sensitivity analysis can be used to project future returns
under varying assumptions for construction cost inflation
and market-rate sales appreciation.
Financial feasibility is established by the ability of
the proposed developments to generate returns within the
range of normal industry expectations. Two pre-tax measures
of profitability and productivity are targeted: Return on
Sales (ROS) defined as net profit/sales proceeds and Return
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on Assets (ROA) calculated as net profit/total development
cost. A minimum return of 15% on both sales and assets is
established as a benchmark. By comparison, The Heritage,
the Druker Company's 88-unit luxury condominium project
overlooking the Public Garden and currently under
construction, is forecasted to earn an ROS of 13.9% and ROA
of 16.2%. Since feasibility is being assessed relative
to private development standards, to the extent that income
mix options are feasible, there will be room for increased
affordability supportable by the project if undertaken by a
non-profit developer.
Since return is expected commensurate with risk, it may
be argued that the New Chardon development can offer lower
returns and still compete for investment. There will be
minimal, if any, site acquisition cost and the entire
affordable component will be pre-sold necessarily though a
lottery. Yet, affordable sales will be at a loss, and the
sale of market-rate units within a mixed-income project at
forecasted levels and absorption rates remains a risky
venture. Given the current uncertainty of project
specifics, at least a 15% threshold seems warranted.
Furthermore, smaller, less established developers might
require even higher returns in order to obtain financing.
The divergent returns generated under each income mix
scenario are highlighted in a comparative sales pro forma,
Table 4 below.
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TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE SALES PRO FORMA
------------------ INCOME MIX SCENARIO -------------------
Mix 1 Mix 2 Mix 3
Sales Proceeds $25,858,649 $51,477,299 $63,040,703
Total Development Cost $43,462,500 $43,462,500 $43,462,500
Net Profit (Before Tax) ($17,603,851) $8,014,799 $19,578,203
Return on Sates -68.1% 15.6% 31.1%
Return On Assets -40.5% 18.4% 45.0%
Equity Required @$8,692,568
NOTE: Mix MIO% Affordable
MI X~A( Makt/Z Afforcia e
M ixNO Mar t b a e (Linked)
Mix 1, representing an entirely affordable project,
illustrates an extreme. Interestingly, no mention was made
of a market-rate component in the Governor's press
conference remarks. This scenario frames the question that
logically followed: were zero site acquisition costs and
favorable HOP financing enough to enable delivery of a 100%
affordable project on the site? As the analysis of housing
economics revealed, each affordable unit built is done so at
a loss. Accordingly, this scenario fails to to pass the
most basic of feasibility tests as development cost exceeds
project value by $17.6MM. The magnitude of the additional
subsidy demanded of the Commonwealth - beyond its
contribution of land, permanent financing and BHA funding -
renders such aggressive affordability infeasible.
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Mix 2 represents a development in which 50% of the units
are affordable and broadly corresponds to the program
outlined by the City for nearby Lowell Square. Generating
an ROS of 15.6% and ROA of 18.4%, the proposed development
offers returns attractive to a private developer. If elderly
units were not included, returns fall to 13.9% and 16.1%,
respectively. Importantly, the analysis indicates that with
the assumed income mix, the housing component can be self-
supporting, not requiring additional subsidy from either the
remainder of the project or the Commonwealth. Any further
subsidy could be used to enhance affordability.
Under the assumptions of Mix 2, the Commonwealth's total
contribution approaches $30MM as detailed below in Table 5,
a comparison of the State's contribution under each
scenario. Additionally, an average price per unit is
included as a gross measure of the affordability to be
received in return. Of the $30MM commitment, approximately
half, or $16.5MM, is the land writedown representing
opportunity cost. The remainder of the contribution, $8.4MM
in HOP financing and $4.8MM in public housing funds,
requires a cash outlay. As mentioned, HOP funds totaling
$35MM have been reserved for Boston projects, and as of
early 1986, $66.6MM and $101.OMM have been authorized for
the Chapter 667 and 705 programs, respectively. It is
expected that the New Chardon project will be funded from
these allocations. If, however, funds are depleted by the
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time the project requires disbursement or monies cannot be
reserved, then New Chardon will require an appropriation of
fresh funds.
TABLE 5
COMMONWEALTH'S CONTRIBUTION
By Income Mix Scenario
--------------- --- --- INCOME MIX SCENARIO ----------------
Mix 1 Mix 2 Mix 3
Land $16.5 $16.5 $6.5
HOP Financing $21.0 $8.4 $5.8 +
705/667 Funding $4.8 $4.8 -
Additional Subsidy $17.6 +
TOTAL $59.9 $29.7 $12.3
Avg. SaLes Price/Unit $61,940 $137,290 $157,600
NOTE: Mix = 0% Affordabl
MIX = Mare I11 Af orgable
Mix 3 Mare / 2 A rd (Linked)
Average SaLes Price excLudes units soLd to BHA
It must be recognized that feasibility is premised upon
base-case assumptions and that returns are highly sensitive
to changes in underlying variables. Total development cost
reacts to changes in hard cost, construction schedule, as
well as, interest rates which affect both construction and
sales period financing. Sales proceeds vary with changes in
market-rate sales/NSF and HOP financing rates. As HOP rates
fall, households can afford to pay more for a particular
unit, thereby closing the gap between development cost and
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sales proceeds and increasing profitability. For example,
while an 8.5% mortgage enables a middle-income household to
carry a 1-bedroom unit worth 2.33 times income, or $59,350,
holding all else equal, 8.0% financing provides for a unit
worth 2.48 times income, or $63,240.
Returns are particularly sensitive to variation in
construction cost and achievable market-rate sales.
Assiduous construction management and savvy marketing will
be required to maintain expected profitability. The
volatility of returns is demonstrated by a sensitivity
analysis displayed as Exhibit 11. Holding all else equal,
if hard cost estimated at $75/GSF increases by $5/GSF, only
7%, ROS declines 36% to 9.9%, rendering 50% affordability
infeasible. Of course, if construction cost can be held to
$70/GSF, the increase in returns is no less dramatic and a
higher percentage of affordable units could be achieved.
Likewise, holding all else equal, if achievable market-rate
sales/NSF are reduced 8% to $230 from $250, ROS falls 35% to
10.2%. In combination, if construction cost is $85/GSF then
market rate sales must be achieved at a rate of $300/NSF in
order to maintain viable profitability and the 50/50 mix.
Lastly, assuming the project comes on-line in the summer of
1989, returns can be forecasted under varying assumptions
for construction cost inflation and market-rate sales
appreciation. The 20-30% appreciation experienced over the
past two years is not expected to be sustained. With annual
sales appreciation of 15%, hard cost can inflate by as much
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as 11% annually to $102.60 without compromising
profitability. On the other hand, if inflation persists at
modest levels, increasing only 5% annually, then sales price
appreciation need only register a compound annual growth
rate of 7% to maintain 50% affordability. To the extent
that sales appreciation is expected to outpace cost
inflation, the project is capable of supporting an increased
ratio of affordable to market-rate units.
Mix 3 illustrates a fundamentally different strategy for
the delivery of affordable housing in which the residual
value of the New Chardon land is extracted and linked to
development of another affordable housing site. If HOP is
applied at its minimum, the development would incorporate
units affordable to moderate-income households as 25% of the
total. With the remaining 300 units at market-rate in an
area with high rents, the development could generate a
robust ROS of 31.1% and ROA of 45.0%. With market sales at
$250/NSF, a developer could afford to pay up to $10MM for
the site and still earn a reasonable return of 15% (Exhibit
11). If market-rate sales/NSF were $275, residual value
climbs to $15MM. With Mix 2, two hundred affordable units
are delivered and the developer cannot afford to pay
anything to the Commonwealth for the site. As such, the
additional one hundred units come at a cost of $10MM, or
equivalently $100,000 per unit. The effect of infusing the
$10MM into a more suburban project for which development
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costs are lower would be the delivery of more than one
hundred affordable units. For example, if development costs
are assumed to be 70% of those on the New Chardon site, the
gap between development cost and sales proceeds on a 2-
bedroom, moderate-income unit approximates $31,000.
Therefore, excluding profit, $100,000 could fund three units
off-site versus one on-site. Similarly, the factor is 4:1
for a middle-income, 2-bedroom unit. Additionally, market
segments not accommodated at New Chardon such as families
could be housed by the developer on the alternate site.
Meanwhile, one hundred affordable units, not an
insignificant number, could be delivered on the downtown
site.
The off-site, linked approach represented by Mix 3 offers
an efficient allocation of resources, if maximizing the
total number of affordable units delivered is the guiding
goal. Undoubtedly, the difficulties of implementation would
be compounded. A direct parcel-to-parcel linkage would be
preferable to a housing fund contribution to be utilized by
some developer, somewhere, sometime in the future. As such,
another suitable, available state-owned parcel would have to
be identified. Most likely, the developer of New Chardon
would be the developer of the linked site, potentially
causing problems by forcing a developer designation too
early in the disposition process of the alternate site. A
more fundamental objection to the linked approach is that it
is counter to public policy objectives considered central to
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the New Chardon initiative. In particular, off-site
delivery conflicts with the goal for downtown affordable
residential development. Mix 3 begins to look more like
other high-end downtown projects rather than the focal
symbol of state-sponsored affordable housing programs it is
expected to be.
Yet, the economics of the linked approach are compelling
and its merits, particularly the ability to reach families,
will necessarily be debated by the CAC. Current thinking,
however, within DCPO and EOCD places primary importance upon
the delivery of units on the downtown site, precisely where
the obstacles to affordable housing are greatest. As such
the public policy objective becomes the maximization of
affordable units on-site. If the preeminence of that
objective holds, then the ultimate development will look
more like that represented by Mix 2. Fifty percent
affordability is likely to be considered a minimum
acceptable level with a moving target toward Mix 1.
Affordability enhancement will be expected from a variety of
possible sources including cost control, non-profit
developer involvement, creative financing and cross-subsidy
from the project's non-housing component.
Non-Housing Economics
The proposed non-housing portion of the New Chardon
development consists of a garage, retail component, day care
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center and shelter facility replacing the Parker Street
Shelter currently operating out of the Lindemann gymnasium.
The garage of approximately 500 cars is the most substantial
component as the other portions combine for only 30,000
square feet and is intended to accommodate the parking
needs of residents. Current zoning governing the site
requires .5 parking spaces per residential unit, though
marketing realities may dictate more. Assuming 200 resident
spaces, the garage would be large enough for public-use
operation. Currently, it is unknown whether it will be a
captive facility of the State, accommodating vehicles
currently on-site, or a free enterprise to be operated by
the developer. Under the former, the State might actually
own the garage built by a private developer receiving a
development fee. This analysis considers the economic
potential of the non-housing component assuming the garage
is owned and operated by the developer.
The ability of the non-housing portion to generate
positive cash flow depends upon financing technique.
Likely, long-term financing will be available only from a
commercial lender. Given strong downtown parking demand,
the garage alone has the potential to generate gross
revenues of approximately $1.4MM based upon 1986 rates
(Exhibit 12). Yet, capital cost is high, estimated at
$11.4MM, and at the assumed commercial terms, debt service
exceeds $1MM. This financing cost coupled with real estate
taxes of $307,000 create a pre-tax deficit exceeding
55
$375,000. Considering the other non-housing components, the
cash flow deficit worsens to approximately $596,000 (Exhibit
13). The shelter is likely to be long-term leased by the
Department of Mental Health (DMH) at an assumed rate equal
to the average of recently negotiated state leases. The
shelter and convenience retail operation are expected to
fully subsidize the day care facility which would pay no
rent. Together, the three elements can potentially generate
net income in the range of $392,000, but, once again, debt
service and real estate taxes create a net loss. If cash
flow is desired by the developer, then clearly alternate
financing arrangements will be necessary to achieve a
desired 10% minimum cash-on-cash return, assuming equity at
20% of total development cost.
Several approaches might be considered to lower debt
service requirements including more favorable loan terms,
additional equity and grant programs. Tax-exempt financing
through the issuance of industrial revenue bonds has been
quite effective; however, pending tax reform legislation
makes the use of IRBs uncertain. Given the garage's
potential to generate revenue, a participating mortgage
might be negotiated. Alternatively, an additional equity
contribution generated from the deeding of parking spaces
might be considered. At a competitive $35,000 per space
(Exhibit 8), deeding of two hundred spaces would generate
$7MM with a gross margin of 35%. If the funds were
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contributed as equity, debt required would be reduced to
$7.1MM, thereby lowering debt service. However, reduced
operating income from the loss of two hundred spaces and the
large sum of invested equity combine to create an
unattractive cash-on-cash return of -1.7% (Exhibit 14).
Clearly, an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) would
improve project economics. A 7.8% cash-on-cash return could
be achieved with only a $1.8MM equity investment, if the
project benefited from a $7MM UDAG (Exhibit 15).
Qualification for a UDAG, though, entails demonstrating that
the project is not viable without federal assistance. Other
grants such as a state Community Action Development Grant
(CDAG) might be applicable, though the facility/
infrastructure would have to be publicly owned.
Public ownership of the non-housing component might be
more efficient in that real estate taxes could be
eliminated. Without the tax burden, cash flow is still
negative, but cash-on-cash return for the non-housing
component improves dramatically from -18.7% to -5.2%. This
impact is understandable considering that real estate taxes
represent 72% of the shortfall. As an alternative to public
ownership, a tax abatement or payment-in-lieu of taxes might
be negotiated with the City.
Since the New Chardon housing component is assumed to be
sold off by the developer, cross-subsidy from on-going lease
operations of the non-housing portion is unlikely. Under a
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rental scenario, it is conceivable that excess cash flow
from the garage might be used to fund operating shortfalls
whether the owner were a private developer or the
Commonwealth. However, if housing is to be sold, then the
likely source of any cross-subsidy will be proceeds from the
deeding of parking spaces, provided the funds are not
required as an additional equity investment in the non-
housing component.
In order to further quantify the economic potential of
the non-housing component, state parking needs and
obligations will have to be determined along with DMH
requirements for the shelter. State claims on the site will
emerge from a polling of state agencies conducted as part of
the disposition process. Once such matters are resolved, the
CAC can focus on defining the New Chardon project, largely
by determining a distribution of development benefits that
satisfies both policy objectives and finanical feasibility
criteria.
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CHAPTER 4
NEW CHARDON AS A MODEL
Undoubtedly, the New Chardon case is special because
of the site's unique history. By making intensive use of
this underutilized and incomplete site, the State has the
opportunity to realize several important public policy
objectives. This chapter highlights New Chardon's
significance as a model for state-sponsored housing
programs, thereby identifying what is at stake should the
project be unsuccessful.
The parcel is significant as a location for a state-
sponsored housing project because of the size of the
development which could be built on the site. Though the
site is smaller than many other surplus parcels that have
undergone or are in the process of disposition, its
allowable high density creates the opportunity for the
delivery of many more housing units. For instance, on the
148-acre Boston State Hospital site, a mix of uses has been
proposed including a residential component, but the
inappropriateness of high density makes the delivery of more
than one hundred units unlikely. New Chardon, by contrast,
has the potential for delivery of two hundred affordable
units and four times as many units in total. Other state
parcels undergoing disposition for which housing has been or
might be proposed include the Dover Elmbank School, Salem
Amory, Lyman School For Boys and Northampton State Hospital.
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None of these compare to New Chardon in terms of the
magnitude of the housing opportunity.
A strategic audit of state land holdings is necessary to
quantify future prospects. Currently, the Office of Real
Property is attempting to catalog excess property not yet
declared surplus with the aim of expediting their
disposition. However, a declaration of surplus must be
initiated at the local agency level where resistance is
encountered to parting with the particular property. As
such, latent opportunities for the use of state land in the
provision of below-market rate housing are hard to
ascertain. Meanwhile, New Chardon stands out for the
dedication of the site exclusively to housing and the
ability to substantially and positively impact affordable
housing supply in downtown Boston.
New Chardon's effect on the housing crisis will be
measured not only by its breadth -- the number of units
delivered -- but also by its depth -- the range of incomes
accommodated. As proposed, the development will be
primarily for households of upper-moderate and middle-
income. Given the down payment requirement and graduated
HOP mortgage structure, homeownership is generally, and at
New Chardon as well, only within reach of households earning
in excess of 70% of median income. Without rental housing
on-site, the project will be unable to meet the needs of
lower-moderate and low-income occupants, except on a limited
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basis through BHA units. Accordingly, New Chardon would not
offer a model for solving the housing crisis from the bottom
up. Instead, Mix 2 represents a program of deep subsidy, at
a cost of $150,000 per affordable unit, extended to a
select segment of the population. From a public policy
standpoint, it is doubtful whether this model could be
widely replicated across the state.
Instead, the New Chardon initiative represents a
trickle-down approach. In theory, the provision of
homeownership opportunities for middle-income households
alleviates pressure on the rental stock, reducing rental
rates for lower income households. In reality, the city-
wide market is so tight that this effect cannot be realized
until a dramatic drop in rental demand is experienced by
landlords. Nonetheless, New Chardon can demonstrate that
public policies and incentives that favor housing
development can make a difference in the number, location,
and price range of units built. Furthermore, it can
illustrate a means of integrating a mix of incomes within a
development.
The New Chardon initiative illustrates a means for
delivering mixed-income housing that would otherwise not be
created by market forces alone. Unarguable is the need for
affordable housing. The controversy is over who pays to
cover the cost of the below-market units. Affordable
housing has clearly emerged as the Governor's top public
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policy priority. New Chardon's statement is that the
Commonwealth is willing to contribute the resources to
stimulate production. Under the assumptions of Mix 2, its
contribution approaches $30MM of which approximately half is
the land writedown. In return, at least a 50% affordable
component is feasible, allowing for a reasonable return to
the developer and conservative market-rate sales. By
contrast, other programs such as linkage and proposed
inclusionary zoning exact the affordable housing resources
from private developers and ultimately, market-rate
occupants.
Successful development of the New Chardon site will
indicate that affordable housing can be developed in Boston,
and particularly downtown, where the challenges to effective
delivery of this kind of housing are greatest. Downtown
costs are high and work against project economics.
Additionally, the City's regulatory and approvals process
injects uncertainty and delay into the development process,
increasing risk and cost. The disposition process must be
artfully managed by DCPO, and City Hall and the State House
must agree on process. If such agreements can be reached,
New Chardon may exemplify a situation in which bureacratic
territorial battles are set aside in the interest of a
common goal.
Especially now in the wake of dismantled federal subsidy,
a joint effort by the State and City is necessary to contend
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with the housing crisis. Congruent public policies and
incentives are required to enhance feasibility and increase
housing production. Importantly, New Chardon can
demonstrate the Commonwealth's capability to merge the
achievement of public policy objectives with those of
private development for the purpose of delivering affordable
housing so vital for continued economic expansion.
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CHAPTER 5
DISPOSITION PROCESS
If the ultimate development is to reflect the State's
public policy priorities, the Commonwealth must exert its
influence through the disposition process and particularly
the RFP. For once that process is complete, much of the
Commonwealth's control over the project's outcome will be
relinquished. Having established what the project can be,
the remainder of the thesis is devoted to exploring how to
get there and what might be encountered along the way. The
nature of the disposition process and the role of the CAC in
defining the development are examined. Critical issues to
be considered by the State in developing RFP guidelines are
presented. Lastly, political feasibility and the role of
the City in shaping the New Chardon development are
considered.
Chapter 579
The development plan for New Chardon must be tailored to
the procedures governing management of state real property
and disposition of surplus land. Management of the
Commonwealth's real property is entrusted to the Division of
Capital Planning & Operations, established by the Omnibus
Construction Reform Act of 1980. This Act, a response to
the Ward Commission's report of widespread corruption within
government in the late 1970's, prescribes an open
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disposition process with procedures promoting fair
competition. Central to the process is the appointment of a
local advisory group to assist in setting development
guidelines for the property. Relatively new, the process is
still being tested as it is applied. Yet, several parcels
have undergone or are in the process of disposition, and New
Chardon is procedurally no different except that uses have
formally been determined for the site.
The disposition process is codified in Chapter 579 of the
Acts of 1980 as amended by Chapter 484 of the Acts of 1984.
As required, the Bureau of State Office Buildings (BSOB) and
the Executive Office of Administration & Finance, the
controlling agency and administrative authority for the New
Chardon parcel, have declared the parcel surplus to their
needs. A polling letter to all Secretariats and Executive
Agencies was circulated by DCPO in June, 1986 to document
the existence of surplus property, solicit any further
interest in it by state agencies, and in this case, outline
the proposed development. Since the site's use has been
predetermined, the only state agencies likely to claim need
will be the Department of Mental Health requesting a shelter
facility and BSOB requesting a parking allocation to
accommodate state vehicles currently on-site. Next, DCPO
must determine that the property is surplus to public need
by polling city and county governments. Since the Mayor has
declared his support for the project, the City will make no
claims on the property for its own use.
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Having determined surplus status on all fronts, DCPO can
initiate disposition to a non-governmental user. As
instructed, a Community Advisory Committee has been convened
to assist in drafting development parameters to be included
in the RFP and incorporated into authorizing legislation.
The CAC will meet over the course of a few months beginning
in August to define the development. Authorizing
legislation outlining the scope of the RFP and broadly
establishing the terms of disposition is expected to be
filed in October, 1986 and passed by year-end. Once
legislation has been filed, DCPO can initiate the RFP
process in accordance with Chapter 579 rules for fair and
open competition. DCPO has proposed an unprecedented meeting
with a limited number of developers to review development
guidelines as one last reality-check before they are
released publicly. Participation in the session may serve as
a prerequisite to designation. Value of such an exchange
is dependent upon the elimination of conflicts of interest.
Distribution of the RFP will be preceded by a Request For
Qualifications in order to narrow the field and streamline
the process. Developer selection is projected for March,
1987. Lastly, a land disposition or land lease agreement
will be negotiated with the selected developer to complete
disposition.
The procedures are straightforward but the process can
get bogged-down, often in the legislature. New Chardon,
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though, is well-backed politically and expected to receive
prompt approval. Governor Dukakis himself is likely to file
the legislation and Senate President Bulger has given the
project his endorsement. Still, the disposition schedule is
ambitious, proposing developer selection within nine months
of the housing announcement. To ensure timely disposition,
the process must be prudently sheparded by DCPO.
Community Advisory Committee
The CAC process is a participatory campaign designed to
crystallize development potential and stimulate
public/private support. To an extent, it is intended to
simulate the marketplace with its competing interests in and
claims upon the site. The appointed, sixteen member
committee offers diversity and expertise. Comprised of
business leaders, real estate practitioners, design
professionals and community group representatives, the CAC
displays strong commitment to local community concerns,
awareness of the City and experience in a range of
disciplines necessary for the delivery of affordable
housing. Elected officials, particularly the Mayor, sit on
the committee as ex-officio representatives. Additionally,
the Boston delegation of the legislature is informed of all
meetings. A CAC membership roster is included as Exhibit
16.
The purpose of the CAC effort is to ensure a feasible
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project and to set high development standards consistent
with community aspirations. The committee will work through
a series of workshops hosted by DCPO and open as much as
possible to the public. The agenda includes evaluating
housing development priorities, financial and legal
feasibility, urban design opportunities and neighborhood
concerns. To heighten the CAC's awareness of design
issues, an Urban Design Ideas Charette will be staged by the
Boston Society of Architects. Participants will work
independently over the course of a weekend to generate
conceptual models and then present their findings to the
CAC. The work of the CAC will culminate in drafting of
development guidelines for the New Chardon site. Upon
review by DCPO, these standards will be incorporated into
the RFP.
RFP Guidelines
The RFP guidelines and, in fact, the entire CAC process
is designed to elicit development of the New Chardon site
that matches political and economic feasibility. It is
expected that by learning as much as possible about the
site's opportunities and constraints and with the aid of an
informed CAC, DCPO will be able to qualify the development
for ultimate quality. The analysis of development options
presented in this thesis goes far in establishing economic
potential and providing a basis for decisions regarding the
distribution of development benefits. Yet, other policy
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issues remain outstanding and must be addressed by the
Commonwealth in its drafting of an RFP.
(A) RFP Strategy
The RFP must provide an incentive sufficient to attract
substantial developer interest, and at the same time,
promote the best deal possible for the Commonwealth. The
State might run the RFP process formally demanding
compliance with well defined guidelines or adopt a more
negotiated, opportunistic approach. From the developer's
standpoint, the certainty of a known quantity is desirable,
yet the flexibility afforded by the negotiated strategy is
more valuable. Either way, the guidelines themselves which
are to ensure the achievement of certain public goals should
be presented as parameters only. An income mix target, for
instance, should be set as a range with the proviso that
all else being equal more affordability is better. As the
sensitivity analysis illustrated, returns are highly
variable with only small changes in underlying conditions.
As such, developers may be unwilling to commit to narrowly
bounded targets for affordable unit production. Design
standards, too, can identify desirable elements without
stifling the ingenuity of developer/architect teams. For
once the disposition process is complete, it is the
creativity and expertise of the private development
community upon which the State is reliant for successful
execution of the project.
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(B) Affordability Enhancement
If the RFP generates widespread response and it is clear
that the number of affordable units is a key selection
criterion, then competition should promote affordability
enhancement. A variety of possible sources include cost
control, non-profit developer involvement, creative
financing and cross-subsidy. Interestingly, the proposed
program -- housing and non-housing combined -- provides an
FAR of 3.0 and increases the FAR for the entire 8.4-acre
site to only 2.9, still far below the allowable maximum of
8. Design schemes that include more than 400 housing units
without compromising the quality of the living environment
might be considered. Additionally, office space might be
evaluated as a profit center to improve the economics of the
non-housing component.
Maximizing the number of affordable units is not,
however, a singular goal for the site, and among other
objectives, achieving a creative urban design solution ranks
highly. Good design will not likely come cheap and given
the high cost of precedent-setting architecture on-site, a
cost constraint might be imposed. This policy tradeoff
between looks and affordability must be resolved in
selecting among alternate development schemes.
(C) Financing Arrangements
Does the Commonwealth prefer to retain control of Parcel 1
through a ground lease arrangement or sell the property out-
right and offer the developer fee simple ownership? While a
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policy decision might be incorporated into the RFP as a
guideline, the issue could be left open enabling developers
to submit proposals under either or, even both,
arrangements. Pricing of the land/lease will have to be
formulated, though an actual agreement with the developer
will be executed as the last step in the disposition
process.
MHFA financing of this project will likely require
special bond underwriting arrangements. Current rating
agency standards limit MHFA to financing no more than 25% of
the units within a single project. Under Mix 2, MHFA
funding would be expected for 50% of the units. The
argument might be made that since the affordable units are
sold at prices much lower than their worth, the project's
loan-to-value ratio is actually much lower than the assumed
80%, warranting greater MHFA participation. The matter
should be resolved in principle prior to release of the RFP
so as to not constrain developer proposals.
(D) Implementation
The sale of units will come long after the disposition
process has been completed. Yet, demand for the affordable
units will be great, and a clear statement of eligibility is
necessary. Undoubtedly, a lottery will be held for the
units and policies must be established for ranking
applicants. Should former West End residents, or their
children, be granted priority? Should downtown workers be
favored? Furthermore, long-term affordability must be
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maintained. Alternate forms of ownership including
condominiums and limited equity co-ops should be considered
along with mechanisms such as deed restrictions and
recovering mortgages.
City's Role
By virtue of the Land Disposition Agreement and
Government Center Urban Renewal Plan to which the parcel is
subject, the BRA has a formal basis for review of the New
Chardon project. This latitude extends beyond its usual
authority to regulate development in Boston. It is crucial
to recognize the City's position and heightened bargaining
power and their impact upon political feasibility.
The City is expected to be a facilitator - promoting the
development by relocating the Langone Funeral Home and
conveying Parcel 1B to the State, amending the Land
Disposition Agreement and streamlining the approvals
process. New Chardon is not likely to be dependent upon the
City's financial resources, but it is subject to it
approval. Consequently, the City potentially wields
significant power over the disposition and development of
the site, though the State is sovereign. While the Mayor
has endorsed the project in principle, how aggressively the
City will assert its claim on the final product remains to
be seen.
The CAC should be the forum for input from the City. Its
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membership roster was offered to the City for review and
recommendation. Among the CAC members is a BRA Design
Review representative and a delegate of the Mayor's North
End Advisory Committee, and the Mayor is an ex-officio
participant. As a planning board with outstanding proposals
in the New Chardon vicinity, the BRA will impact urban
design guidelines. Since the Land Disposition Agreement
provides for BRA approval of any party to whom the State
transfers its interest in the property, the City will have a
voice in the developer selection process. The BRA will, at
least, have to approve the developer designation and may
attempt to participate in the actual selection process with
DCPO.
It is important for DCPO to position the City by building
consensus through the disposition process. The City must
make its desires for the site known through the CAC process
so that the RFP will be consistent with city objectives,
providing a smoother approvals process for the ultimate
developer. Strategically, the amendment of documents should
be sought late in the process after support has been
enlisted and the City has been party to decision-making.
Likely, the City would drive a harder bargain in terms of
exactions if the proposed use were private office. In
general, the political feasibility of the New Chardon
development as proposed is enhanced by the overriding
priority assigned to the delivery of affordable housing by
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both state and city officials.
If input from the BRA is an integral part of the CAC's
agenda, and particularly, if the proposed unprecedented
early involvement of private developers is fruitful, the New
Chardon case can exemplify a dynamic model for real property
disposition. This enterprising approach can be contrasted
to the more static format generally utilized up until now.
If the process is well executed, then the product will more
effectively merge the achievement of public policy
objectives with those of private development. The ability
to forge such public-private partnerships, as demonstrated
by development of the New Chardon site, will be increasingly
vital to the successful delivery of affordable housing
throughout the Commonwealth.
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COMPARABLE SALES:
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Downtown Boston
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Mtg.Ins.Rate- 0 0 HMtg. Ins.Rate: 0
Hoe Ins.Rate: He Ins.Rate:
Co 0 Fee Rate: U. U Condo Fee Rate: UU
TOTAL COST FACTOR:
COST/INCOME RATIO:
PRICE/INCOME RATIO:
0 P
2.83
TOTAL COST FACTOR:COST/INCOME RATIO:
PRICE/INCOME RATIO: 2.33
SMSA
Median Income
Unit Size Median Income
.I ....
Middle Afford Moderate Afford
Unit Size Income Factor Price Income Factor Price
Avg Income 100% median 75% median
0,
Lfl
Family Size
HH Size
EXHIBIT 10
SALES PROCEEDS vs. DEVELOPMENT COST
By Unit Type
NSF
De 11 %NSF' S%886 NSF
SALES P CEEDS
BHA moderate middLe market
ti: 1II00 11 n11
G A N (G P)
BHA moderate middLe market
Il2i' : 71
AVG ($43,708) ($58,200) ($52,387) $90,031
Unit Size
UNIT
UNIT
CO0S T
0:E1
(111: 6'i 'IWM
EXHIBIT 11
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Table It Impact of Construction Cost
Changes on Mix 2 Returns
Construction
Cost/GSF ROS ROA
$60
$65$70
$75
$80
$85
$90
$95
$100
32.5Z
26.81
21.2Z
15.6%
9.9%
4.3%
-1.31
-6.91
-12.6%
48.11
36.71
26.9%
18.41
11.0%
4.5%
-1.3%
-6.51
-11.27
Table 2: Impact of Market-rate Sales
Changes on Mix 2 Returns
Market-Rate
Sales$/NSF ROS R0A
$200$210$220
$230
$240
$250
$260
$270
$280$290
$300
0.81
4.21
7.3%
10.21
13.01
15.6%
18.0%
20.31
22.5%
24.51
26.51
0.81
4.41
7.9%
11.4%
14.9%
18.41
22.0%
25.5%
29.0%
32.51
36.01
Table 3: Impact of Construction Cost & Market-rate Sales Changes on Mix 2 ROS
--------------------------Market-rate
$240
30.4%
24.6%
18.81
13.0%
7.2%
1.4%
-4.4%
-10.21
-16.0%
$250
32. 51
26.8X
21.21
15.6%
9.9%
4.31
-1.3%
-6.97
-12.6%
$260
34.4%
28.9%
23.51
18.0l
12.51
7.11
1.6%
-3.9%
-9.3%
Sales$270
36.2%
30.9%
25.6%
20.31
15.0%
9.7%
4.41
-0.91
-6.31
$/NSF------------------------------$280
38.01
32.8%
27.6%
22.5Z
17.31
12.17
7.0%
1.81
-3.41
$290
39.61
34.6%
29.6%
24.57
19.5%
14.5%
9.4%
4.4%
-0.61
$300
41.21
36.31
31.41
26.51
21.61
16.71
11.81
6.9%
2.01
Table 4: Impact of Cost Inflation & Market-rate Sales Appreciation on Mix 2 ROS (1989)
------------------------------------
Annual
Cost
Inf I ation,
4Z
51
61
71
81
91
101
II
121
51
14.9%
12.4%
9.9%
7.3%
4.71
2.01
-0.7%
-3.51
-6.3%
71
18.57.
16.21
13.8%
11.31
8.8%
6.3%
3.7%
1.0%
-1.7%
Annual Sales
91
22.11
19.91
17.67
15.2%
12.8%
10.4%
7.91
5.3%
2.7%
Appreciation
25.41
23.31
21.11
18.8%
16.51
14.21
11.8%
9.31
6.81
131
28.6%
26.51
24.41
22. 21
20.0%
17.8%
15.51
13.11
10.81
15X
31.5%
29.51
27.5%
25.41
23.3%
21.1%
19.01
16.7%
14.4%
Table 5: Impact of Site Acquisition Cost
Changes on Mix 3 Returns
Site Acquisition
Cost ROS RDA
0
2000000
$4,000,000
$6,000,000
$8,000,000
$10,000,000
$12,000,000
$14,000,000
$16,000,000
31.11
27.9%
24.71
21.51
18.4%
15.21
12.01
8.8%
5.7%
45.01
38.7%
32.8%
27.5%
22.51
17.9Z
13.7%
9.71
6.01
87
Construction
Cost/GSF
$60
$65
$70
$75
$80$85
$90
$95
$100
EXHIBIT 12
GARAGE
OPERATING PRO FORMA
Residenti Units 0 Devel nt Cost Financing
Parmng A ocatio. Cons ruct / space $15,0 Loan to Value %
Residentia Month ies u Hard Cost $7,500,0 Loan Amount $9,120Soft.Cost cost Interest 10 %
Rates tructyre Contngenc cost Term
a gatu Tota ev ost $11,400,00 Debt Svc $1,199,0
OPERATING PRO FORMA:* 500 spaces
Potential Gross Revenue # spaces Period/Yr Rate(86) Turnover Revenue
o h nths $1
Da ong-Term ays
D Short-Term ays W IN
Nih ays
Sa rdav/Sundav/Holiday ays
Boston G aren Events 30 8ays 5 1 $120888
Potential Gross Revenue $1,413,960
Operating Expenses @ 20% $282,792
Real Estate Taxes @ $27 /$1000 value $307,800
Net Income $823, 68
Return on Asset (NOI/TDC)
Debt Service $1,199,041
Cash Flow Before Tax ($375 67
Cash-on-Cash Return (CFBT/Equity)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Revenue and Operating Expense estimates developed
with the assistance of Kinney Parking System, Boston
EXHIBIT 13
NON -HOUSING
OPERATING PRO FORMA
Rent/SL Financing $15,960,0
Day Care Loan:Value%
Shelter $17.00 Loan Amount $12,768 0Interest 1 0%
Oprati rg Expense/ SF Svc $1,678,6 yrs
Day Care
Shelter e00
RE Tax (per $1000 value) $27
Vacancy 5%
OPERATING PRO FORMA
-------------------------
Potentia Gross Revenue $200 $1,885,960
e er$7
Garage
Vacancy Allowance $10,000
Effective Gross Income $1,875,960
Operating Expense $362,792
RetailDay Care ~ '8
Shelter
Garage $282,7
Real Estate Taxes $430,920
Retail/Day Care/Shelter $1,120
Garage 5378
Net Operating Income $1 ,082,?4%
Returh on Asset (NOI/TDC)
Debt Service $1,678,657
Cash Flow Before Tax ($596 402
Cash -on-Cash Return (CFBT/Equity) . %
NOTE: Total Development Cost fr Retail/Day Cre ter totals $15.96MM
@gnN ad 
ts a t 16 SF. Re 1 SF, Day Care
EXHIBIT 14
NON-HOUSING OPERATING PRO FORMA
Additional Equity Contribution
From Deeded Parking Proceeds
Rent/SE Financing
Retail $ TDC $15,960,0
Dgy Care Spaces sold
S elter $Si . Lan:Value %
Loan Amount $7,168 0
Operating Expense/ SF Interest is %
Retaig Ten yrs
Dgy Care De t Svc $942,40S elter 0
RE Tax (per $1000 value) $27
Vacancy 5%
OPERATING PRO FORMA
--------------------------------------------------------------
C Potentia Gross Revenue $1,525,960
Retail $200,0
Day Care
Shelter
Garage
Vacancy Allowance $10,000
Effective Gross Income $1,515,960
Operating Expense $290,792
Retail
Day Care
Shelter
Garage $210,71
Real EState Taxes $430,920
Retai/Day Care/SheLter
Garage 1307,0
Net Operating Income $794,J48
Return on Asset (NOI/TDC)
Debt Service $942,404
Cash Flow Before Tax ($148,156)
Cash-on-Cash Return (CFBT/Equity) -1.7%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT 15
NON-HOUSING OPERATING PRO FORMA
Urban Action Development Grant (UDAG)
Rent/Sf Financing
Retail $ TDC $
U~ $ ui t1eiter Loan Exmount
Operating Expense/ SF Interest % s
R etai.eyr
DyCare Deft Svc $942,40 yS elter$.0
RE Tax (per $1000 value) $27
Vacancy 5%
OPERATING PRO FORMA
Potentia Gross Revenue $200,$1885960
Day Care
Shelter
Garage $1,41'6
Vacancy Allowance $10,000
Effective Gross Income $1,875,960
Operating Expense $362,792
Retair
Day Care R O
Shelter
Garage $282 ,70
Real E$tate Taxes $430,920
Retafl/Day Care/Shelter
Garage
Net Operating Income $1,082,g4
Returh on Asset (NOI/TDC)
Debt Service $942,404
Cash Flow Before Tax $139,844
Cash-on-Cash Return (CFBT/Equity) 7.8%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT 16
COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEMBERSHIP ROSTER
NAME AF F I L I AT ION
DanieL Taylor (Chairman) Hill & Barlow
A rew AL essi ackstone AptsFo rr W st End Tenant
Simone Auster Greater Boston h r Commerce
Peter Brown North Station Susinessien.Association
John detgonchaux BRA Qesign Reyiew Commissign
David Dixon American Institute ot Architects
Reee Fayde Real Estate Enterprise Inc.B1 eruL Mayor's North End Advisory Committee
Jose Hene i ld Housing Economics
Bone Heud rer Communi ty Inestments Bank of Boston
Marty Jones Cerqoran Mul ins ennlson Co.
WiL am Jones C1 izens H using Planning Association
Isaac Lyumkis Gotdstein Mane o
John Marston Boston Trade Bank
Vincent MqCarthy Ha & Dorr/Massacbusetts Housing.Partnership
Jim McNeeLv Archtect/BeaCon Hi L Civic Association
A an Pai et Hwt orne Residents Association
Peter Smith The Cottonwood Company
E X 0 F F I C I O
William Bulger Senate President
Sal vatore DiMasi Re resentative
Rayipond Flynn Ma or .
David Scondras C1 y Councilor
AD MIN IS T R AT IVE SUPPOR T
Executive Office o A ministration & Einance
Division of Cpita lannng. & O ration
Executive Of ice o Compunities Development
Executice Of ice of Environmenta Af airs
Executive Of ce of Human Services
Governor's 0 ice of Economic Development
Boston Redeve opment Authority
Boston Legsl at ye Delegation
Mayor's 0 Ice of Neighborhood Services
Mayor's 0 fice
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